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Who speaks in the name of the Constitution? In Constitutional
Dialogues, Louis Fisher debunks the Judiciary's pretensions to the role
of oracle, "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.",
In part, his aim is to demonstrate the elaboration of constitutional law
as a political process, shaped by interaction among judges and other
political actors. But he also attempts to stake out an intermediate position between equating constitutional law with judicial rulings and fully
decentralizing interpretive authority. He advocates a notion of tripartite
"coordinate construction" that shares prestige among Supreme Court
pronouncements and the interpretive positions of the First and Second
Branches.
A political scientist with the Congressional Research Service,
known for such books as Presidential Spending Power and Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President, Dr. Fisher understandably emphasizes the interpretive voice of Congress. His insights as a close observer of the congressional process are especially
welcome. Legal scholars have too rarely taken the trouble to study congressional deliberations on constitutional questions, and political scientists have too rarely taken seriously the characteristics that distinguish
constitutional argument. In his current book, Fisher writes from the
"internal" perspective of the legal culture as well as from the "extert Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This review is dedicated to Hon. Abner J. Mikva, in celebration of the tenth anniversary of
the events recounted infra. I would like to thank Ed Baker, Mike Fitts, and Seth
Kreimer, who were generous with their time and comments, and Mrs. Margaret
Ulrich, for her precision and support. All remaining errors are random.
* Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Government Division, Congressional
Research Service, The Library of Congress.
1 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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nal" perspective of a political scientist; he does not take a skeptical
stance toward the possibility of "constitutional law." 2 He argues that
congressional interpretations of the Constitution actually influence
court decisions, and further that this influence reflects a special interpretive authority constitutionally vested in each of the three federal
branches. This power of "coordinate construction" justifies legislative
action based on congressional interpretations that conflict with prior
judicial precedent.
The debate over the binding scope of Supreme Court decisions is
an important one. A resurgence of Congress vis-a-vis the Judiciary
would echo and facilitate its attempts at resurgence vis-a-vis the President. Respect for coordinate branches has long featured in the tradition
of judicial rhetoric. Has the reality corresponded to the rhetoric, revealing constitutional development as a kind of triple concerto?
A sustained argument for coordinate construction might proceed
on three levels. First, it might demonstrate empirically that the Supreme Court tends to bring itself into line with Congress's views.3 Second, it might offer evidence that legislative, judicial, or executive officers view Congress as having special interpretive authority. Third, it
might elaborate a normative argument in favor of vesting such authority in Congress.
Fisher operates primarily on the first and second of these levels,
providing illustrative evidence for his thesis. The normative background
includes majoritarianism, a presumption of equality among the
branches, and the unpersuasiveness of arguments for privileging the
voice of the Judiciary. But Fisher does not really attempt to derive
Congress's power from these assumptions and, perhaps as a result, he
leaves the notion of special interpretive authority less than fully specified. For example, he does not spell out the limits (if any) on coordinate
construction. Nor is he careful to identify the modes in which "Congress" can speak with special interpretive authority. Ultimately, the
stories he has chosen supply only weak support for his thesis, and fail
2

For examples of Fisher's judgments on what the Constitution requires, see L.

FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROcESS

64-

65 (1988) (approving and disapproving of various methods of constitutional interpretation); id. at 151 (on judicial salary increases); id. at 216-21 (rejecting limitless power of
Congress over federal court jurisdiction). See also Fisher, How to Avoid Iran-Contras,
76 CALIF. L. REV. 939, 949-50, 958-59 & n.93 (1988) (condemning the coordinate

construction activities of Col. Oliver North).
' For varying estimates of this tendency, see Casper, The Supreme Court and
National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 50 (1976); Dahl, Decision-Making in
a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279
(1957); Tushnet, Schneider & Kovner, Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure:
An Observation, 66 TEx. L. REV. 967 (1988).
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to demonstrate that Congress's interpretive authority applies to constitutional issues generally, rather than to a narrow class of issues and
circumstances.
I.

STORIES' COMMENTARIES

The book is rich in anecdote. Its material is drawn partly from
court cases, partly from political history, and partly from activities of
modern Congresses that the author has observed firsthand. Collecting
together these "vignettes" makes a valuable contribution to the literature, and gives concreteness to the form of dialogue that Fisher
advocates.
A few of these tales illustrate constitutional dialogue in the most
literal sense: purely communicative debate about the Constitution, in
which influence depends solely on the rational persuasive force of the
argument. Representatives of Congress and the judiciary do make appearances on each other's turf. Members of Congress once participated
as attorneys before the courts, more frequently in the days when the
Supreme Court spoke from the Senate basement. Today they are increasingly likely to perform as clients, sending their lawyers across
First Street or Constitution Avenue to ask the courts to reinforce their
positions. Judges in turn have lobbied Congress both by letter and in
person. And of course executive officials appear frequently before court
or Congress. Fisher does not, however, discuss educative communications addressed to the people, like the theatrics of the Iran-Contra hearings, or the direct appeals described by Jeffrey Tulis in The Rhetorical
Presidency.
A second and more important dialogue for Fisher involves actions
that speak loudly in the exercise of governmental power. Justices may
write books, but the Supreme Court claims a different kind of authority
for the interpretations contained in its judgments. Other political actors
may do the same for the interpretations expressed in their official acts.
The Constitution assigns powers to each of the three branches; in exercising its powers, each must construe provisions of the Constitution;
and each of these authorized interpretations is entitled to respect.
Fisher takes pains to reject the model of constitutional interpretation
that reserves all constitutional issues for the courts to decide in isolation, with no role for the political branches.4
4 This should be uncontroversial. Despite excesses of rhetoric, such as Felix
Frankfurter's statement that "the Supreme Court is the Constitution," see L. FISHER,
supra note 2, at 245 (quoting Frankfurter), it is hard to find serious students of the
subject who believe in so extreme a model.
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Fisher successfully demonstrates that the Court's interpretations
are not "final" in the crudest sense. Political forces can procure their
reversal. Judges are not apolitical creatures, but are motivated to preserve the power of their roles. Threats to withdraw jurisdiction or massive noncompliance may prompt them to rethink their positions. Personnel changes can bring the Court in line with majority desires. And if
the opposition is strong enough, the Constitution can be amended to
overturn almost any interpretation.
In characterizing the Court as a political institution, Fisher demonstrates that constitutional interpretation is an enterprise open to everyone. Values must inform interpretation, and judges derive their values from the culture they live in. Judicial independence does not mean
judges from Mars. Every social interaction that affects the values people hold potentially influences constitutional interpretation. Fisher
quotes Paul Brest's observation that "constitutional issues are not radically discontinuous from other political issues." 5 The interpretive powers of Congress, then, also include the power to embody in ordinary
legislation values that may come to possess constitutional significance.
Moreover, under modern balancing approaches, legislative actions
against valued rights may often be justified by claims of necessity. Necessity, however, results in part from institutional environments shaped
by legislation. Thus it will sometimes be true that Congress, like
Wotan, has created the need as well as the weapon.
Coordinate Construction
Yet the foregoing are rather modest claims of congressional influence on constitutional interpretation, and do little but establish the
groundwork for Fisher's discussion of coordinate construction. Fisher
claims for Congress and the President a special authority in constitutional dialogue differing in kind from that of state officials and the public at large:
Under the doctrine of "coordinate construction," the President and members of Congress have both the authority and
the competence to engage in constitutional interpretation, not
only before the courts decide but afterwards as well. All
three branches perform a valuable, broad, and ongoing function in helping to shape the meaning of the Constitution. 6
Id. at 277 (quoting Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
175, 184 (1986)).
" Id. at 231-32.
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Fisher believes that the Supreme Court's resolution of a particular justiciable controversy is binding on the parties to the dispute, and that the
other branches must submit to that resolution in the interest of finality
and the rule of law. His reference to a power to interpret "afterwards
as well," however, means that Congress is bound only by the Supreme
Court's particular decisions, and not by its interpretations. Congressional resistance to judicial interpretations is not extralegal. He writes
approvingly of Lincoln's view on the limited authority of the Dred
Scott decision: "Congress and the President were free to reach their
own constitutional judgments, even if at odds with past Court rulings,
and then let the Court decide again."'
Fisher thus aligns himself with commentators ranging from Alexander Bickel to Edwin Meese who champion Lincoln's stance over the
judicial supremacist doctrine of Cooper v. Aaron,9 which treats the Supreme Court's elaboration of constitutional norms as legally binding.
Sanford Levinson has recently described the former as the "protestant"
view that every individual must ultimately take responsibility for interpreting the Constitution herself, rather than submitting to the doctrinal
authority of the Court.10
Fisher differs from many of these commentators, however, in further ascribing special interpretive authority to Congress because of its
status as one of three co-equal branches of the federal government.
Unless we understand the unsettled nature of the Court's authority to review actions by other branches, we are unable to
see why the door is deliberately left open for congressional
and executive participation. It is one thing to concede the
Supreme Court's duty to review state actions but quite another to accept judicial review of coordinate bodies, Congress
and the President.1 1
Though his rhetoric sometimes slips back to a merely "protestant" poSee id. at 238-42.
8 Id. at 242.
9 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
10 See S. LEVINSON, CONSTrrUTIONAL FArrH 37-50 (1988). See generally Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071 (1987). I should confess
myself to be more in the judicial supremacist than the "protestant" camp.
n L. FISHER, supra note 2, at 11. Similarly, Fisher's case against judicial
supremacy does not include the antebellum claims of the states to serve as guardians of
the Constitution by means of nullification. Characteristically, his discussion of judicial
error regarding the Sedition Act of 1798 addresses Jefferson's pardons and Congress's
compensatory appropriations, and ignores the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions on
interposition. See id. at 238-39.
7

1856

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 137:1851

sition,"2 his final chapter, emphasizing "Coordinate Construction,"
forms the climax of the book, advocating an intermediate position between judicial supremacy and the decentralization of interpretive
authority.
Fisher inadequately supports this claim, however, by failing to
elaborate its details and by relying on a range of narrative illustrations
narrower than the apparent reach of his thesis. Although many writers
agree that the legitimacy of resisting Supreme Court rulings involves
matters of degree, Fisher does not attempt to specify the circumstances
that he believes would justify nonacquiescence in the Supreme Court's
interpretations. He does not address how wrong the decision must be,
how abhorrent its consequences, how likely overruling must be, how
often the other branches can submit identical cases to the courts, or
what other methods they should use to change the constitutional course.
Rejecting the pretensions of Cooper v. Aaron, Alexander Bickel wrote
that southern officials who opposed desegregation could rightly "refuse
to consider the issue settled and could relitigate it at every opportunity
that the judicial process offered, and of course it offers a thousand and
one."1 Fisher cites Bickel's analysis, but does not commit himself on
4
this example.'
Fisher's focus on congressional nonacquiescence obscures the violent potential of uninhibited coordinate construction (and of "protestantism" as well). To a great extent, Congress acts only by speaking,
and relies on the other branches to carry out its directives. The Executive Branch employs more direct means. It can execute human beings
as well as laws. It can arrest human beings, and hold them in confinement,1 5 or transport them to foreign countries. 6 And it may do these
things swiftly and irremediably. Though Fisher says that the political
branches are free to withhold compliance in like cases and "let the
Court decide again," the opportunity for decision may come too late, or
never.
Fisher's strongest example is a considerably milder one, the story
of the Child Labor Amendment:17 the Supreme Court rejected Congress's effort to regulate child labor under the commerce clause in 1918,
and repulsed Congress's renewed effort to suppress child labor through
See, e.g., id.

12
at 247.
13 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

264 (1962).
But see L. FISHER, supra note 2, at 233 (noting Meese's "unfortunate references to . . .the Little Rock Case"); id. at 275 ("The unanimous ruling in 1958,
signed by each Justice, was essential in dealing with the Little Rock crisis.").
16 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
16 See Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
VI See L. FISHER, supra note 2, at 238-42.
14
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an excise tax in 1922, whereupon Congress sent a constitutional
amendment to the states for ratification. The slow process of ratification was mooted when Congress reenacted the statutory ban as part of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The child labor example does
illustrate the political branches' victory over judicial precedent on a
constitutional issue, so great a victory that Bruce Ackerman has characterized it as a "structural amendment."" But the victory was already
won in other fields of regulation before Congress reenacted its child
labor provisions, so that the reenactment was hardly a daring challenge
to the Court.19 Moreover, Fisher's discussion is oddly silent about the
President's role in that victory; whether or not one accepts Ackerman's
account of the New Deal struggle as a rare form of higher lawmaking
by the People,2" it is hard to view it as exemplifying a routine power of
Congress.
Other examples of Fisher's also tend to support theses either narrower or broader than his notion of coordinate construction. For example, Fisher quotes from Justice Jackson's striking homily pointing out
that:
Nothing in the history or attitude of this Court should give
rise to legislative embarrassment if in the performance of its
duty a legislative body feels impelled to enact laws which
may require the Court to reexamine its previous judgment or
doctrine. The Court differs, however, from other branches of
the Government in its ability to extricate itself from error. It
can reconsider a matter only when it is again properly
brought before it in a case or controversy; and if the case
requires, as a tax case does, a statutory basis for a case, the
new case must have sufficient statutory support. 21
Fisher rightly classifies this, however, as a "Judicial Invitation[]" the majority needed Congress's aid to arrange a prospective overruling
for a tax law precedent that the Court had already badly impaired.22
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1069 (1984).
19 See H.R. REP. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6, 10-11 (1938) (discussing
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
20 See Ackerman, supra note 18, at 1051-56 (New Deal legislation legitimated by
successful shift from "normal politics" to "higher lawmaking" track).
21 L. FISHER, supra note 2, at 247 (quoting Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371,
400-01 (1943)).
22 See Helvering, 318 U.S. at 402-04 (inviting Congress to enact legislation inconsistent with Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), which had held that a common
stock dividend on common stock was not income for purposes of the sixteenth
amendment).
lB
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Jackson's reference to "a legislative body," and the citations in an accompanying footnote, make plain that he was not invoking a special
power of Congress, but rather one shared by state legislatures.
Moreover, Jackson was not inviting or legitimating massive resistance to court doctrine. The distribution of government powers may
create temporary lacunae requiring officials to take actions of uncertain
legality in the hope of subsequent ratification. That was one basis on
which the Supreme Court upheld President Lincoln's blockade of the
Confederacy in The Prize Cases.23 Unfortunately, the modern history
of separation of powers has been characterized by the Executive's efforts to convert such emergency, conditional powers into unregulable
inherent powers. Equating Jackson's observation with a broad power of
coordinate construction would amount to a similar transformation.
Fisher moves too quickly in inferring the legitimacy of coordinate
construction in conflict with the courts from the duty of executive officials or Congress to make "initial interpretations," that is, to consider
constitutional objections to their proposed actions or enactments. First,
that duty is shared by state officials, and so it cannot entail a special
authority of co-equal federal branches. Moreover, Congress itself has
afforded no such deference to the "initial interpretations" of state officers - Congress reinforced their duties of circumspection by imposing
civil and criminal sanctions under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and it
has never made available a defense for conscientious nonacquiescence.24
It is also not clear that "initial interpretation" is a responsibility of
Congress, as opposed to a responsibility of its individual members.
Should a member with constitutional doubts about a statute feel any
more bound by the views of a congressional majority than by the views
of the Supreme Court? To the extent that we trace the member's duty,
as Fisher does,2" to her oath to support the Constitution under Article VI, section 3, we are identifying an individual, "protestant"-type
duty shared by state officials, and not a power vested in a branch.
The duty of "initial interpretation" is also asymmetrical -it
obliges legislators to oppose unconstitutional laws, but obviously cannot
impel them to support every law that would be constitutional. Constitu23

67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); see also L.

FLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CON288-89 (1985).

24 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982). Acts of initial interpretation leading to death may be punishable by life imprisonment. The good faith immunity defense under § 1983 requires defendants to show that the rights they violated
were not "clearly established" by court precedent, not that they sincerely believed that
the precedents were wrong. I admit this doctrine is judicially crafted, but Congress has
not modified it.
25

See L.

FISHER,

supra note 2, at 233-34.
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tional provisions leave legislatures an enormous range within which to
select favored policies. In consequence, statutes that provide greater
protection for constitutional rights than the courts think the Constitution affords, are not necessarily instances of coordinate construction.
Some of Fisher's concrete examples in the search and seizure area
illustrate this defect in his approach. Both state and federal legislatures
can restrain their respective agents by adding statutory prohibitions to
the constitutional ones. Even if legislators conclude that the Court has
rightly construed the ban on "unreasonable searches," they may choose
for the present to forbid a category of otherwise reasonable searches.
Fisher characterizes this choice as the rebalancing of privacy and law
enforcement interests that were erroneously weighed by the courts, 6
but it does not really amount to constitutional interpretation at all,27 as
is particularly emphasized by the degree to which later Congresses feel
free to tinker.2"
More might be read into one of these search and seizure examples,
however, to the extent that Congress also extended protection against
searches by state officials. Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act
of 1980 to avert the consequences of a Supreme Court decision uphold26

See id. at 255.

Of course, as I mentioned earlier, such statutes do enter into a constitutional
dialogue with the courts - statutory protections, if actually observed, may help mold
social notions of privacy that inform fourth amendment analysis, and the statute itself is
one easily accessible form of evidence of an expectation of privacy "'that society is
prepared to honor.'" Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696 (1989) (quoting California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986)).
28 For example, Fisher describes how Congress's dissatisfaction with the Supreme
Court's limited protection of bank records in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976), led to the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat.
3697-3710 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3401-22 (1982)). "In essence, certain safeguards to
Fourth Amendment rights that were unavailable because of the Supreme Court's decision were now secured by congressional action." L. FISHER, supra note 2, at 258. But
for how long? Fisher does not mention the series of subsequent amendments, including
a 1986 amendment relating to FBI demands that was expressly justified by the nonconstitutional status of the statutory protections. See Pub. L. No. 99-569, § 404, 100 Stat.
3197 (1986) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (Supp. V. 1988) (authorizing FBI
counterintelligence access to financial records of agents of foreign powers); H.R. Rep.
690(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5343-44 ("Since, as the Miller case held, governmental access to a customer's financial records held by a bank does not implicate a constitutionally protected
right of privacy, the Committee concluded that the 'probable cause' standard was not
warranted."); see also Pub. L. No. 96-3, 93 Stat. 5 (1979) (repealing notice provisions
formerly in 12 U.S.C. § 3404(d) (1982)); Pub. L. No. 96-433, 94 Stat. 1855 (1980)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(h) (1982)) (applying lower standards to Securities Exchange Commission); Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 432(a), 96 Stat. 1527 (1980) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (authorizing additional interagency use of information);
Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 121(c)(3)(C), 97 Stat. 83 (1983) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 3414(k)(1) (Supp. V. 1988) (authorizing certain disclosures to Department of Treasury, Social Security Administration, and Railroad Retirement Board).
27
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ing a search of a newspaper's editorial office,2" and chose to restrict
both state and federal searches."0 One might view this statute as a legislative construction of the first, fourth, and fourteenth amendments
predicated on congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, 1 relying on Justice Brennan's famous second alternative
in Katzenbach v. Morgan.3 2 But the very thing that makes Brennan's
opinion in Morgan so noteworthy is the contrast between his proposal
for special section 5 powers of Congress and the usual distribution of
authority in the constitutional dialogue.
Morgan power cases, like "political question" cases, would deflate
a claim of complete judicial monopoly if anyone made it, but they do
not demonstrate general powers of coordinate construction. As read in
Morgan, section 5 expressly commits to Congress a power to enforce a
particular amendment through legislation, i.e., via bicameral passage
and presentment. 3 Moreover, this emphasis on the authority of legislative action undermines Fisher's stated thesis by withholding co-equal
privilege from executive action.
More interesting are Fisher's adversions to constitutional common
law.3 4 In the law of search and seizure, as elsewhere, some of the
Court's rulings do not announce irreducible constitutional minima, but
rather erect safeguards or remedies implementing constitutional principles as a matter of federal common law. For example, the Burger
Court tended to view the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in that
light. The distinction implicates powers of displacement - federal
See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 101, 94 Stat. 1879
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1982)) [hereinafter Privacy Protection Act]; see also
L. FISHER, supra note 2, at 255-57.
31 See 126 CONG. REC. 26563 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("With respect to searches directed against persons preparing materials for broadcast or publication, we retained the features of the original bill-which apply to State and local as
well as Federal officials. The justification involved is the historic obligation of the Federal Government to protect the free speech values of the first amendment."). On the
other hand, one might equally view these provisions as employing the commerce power
to minimize disruption of publishing and broadcasting; see S. REP. No. 874, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
3956 (invoking commerce clause), and note the tell-tale limitation to "a newspaper,
book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 30.
32 384 U.S. 641, 653-56 (1966); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
109 S. Ct. 706, 718 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
" See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-51. As long as we are talking about Justice Brennan's proposal, even section 5 powers differ from coordinate construction notions because of the "ratchet" principle: Congress can enhance individual rights beyond court
holdings, but cannot diminish them. See id. at 651 n.10.
" See L. FISHER, supra note 2 at 264-70. If one views dormant commerce clause
analysis as an exercise in constitutional common law, then see id. at 247-49 as well.
29
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common law binds the states, but is subject to revision by Congress
pursuant to a variety of legislative powers, including the necessary and
proper clause. This fact alone would suffice to facilitate interbranch
dialogue tangential to constitutional interpretation. The field of discussion blurs, however, because of chronic uncertainty in characterizing
particular decisions as direct interpretation or common-law-making. If
Congress misjudges what the Justices intended, it may attempt to override by statute a ruling that it mistakenly views as constitutional common law. The statutory challenge might evoke a rebuff from the Court,
but instead might prompt the Court to rethink the status of its rule.
Although Congress's coordinate power to modify constitutional common
law rules cannot be equated with a power to modify constitutional interpretations, it can add to the legitimacy of some efforts to probe the
Court's firmness.
Institutional as well as intellectual difficulties beset reliance on the
notion of Congress's expressing constitutional construction in legislation. To say that a statute expresses a congressional judgment on its
own constitutionality is often a transparent fiction. Judicial practice accords a formal presumption of constitutionality to all legislation, state
and federal, regardless of whether the legislators ever have or ever
could have considered the constitutional objection. Congress has never
attempted to develop a constitutional jurisprudence independent of the
Court's, and has no institutional mechanism to insure its continuing
fidelity to its own supposed constitutional interpretations. Fisher notes,
apparently with approval, that both Houses of Congress resolve constitutional objections to bills by majority vote.3 5 He has noted elsewhere
the pressures contributing to instances of congressional failure to consider constitutional issues.3
Many others believe that Congress does not responsibly exercise
the interpretive authority it has already.37 Fisher lets an apt vignette of
the case against Congress slip through in quoting Strom Thurmond's
description of the Privacy Protection Act of 19808 as an attempt to
"strike a careful balance between the first amendment right to free ex3 See id. at 35.

36 See Fisher, ConstitutionalInterpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L.
REv. 707, 718, 746-47 (1985).
S See, e.g., Brest, supra note 5, at 183-84; Mikva, How Well Does Congress

Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REv. 587 (1983); cf. J. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLrrICAL PRocEss 235-39 (1980) ("Observers of our national government and defenders of judicial review in particular have often
forcefully contended that the nonjudicial branches are simply incapable of responsible
constitutional decisionmaking.").
S See text accompanying note 30.
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pression and the fourth amendment." 9 That the good Senator thinks
the fourth amendment protects the government's right to search is depressing, though not surprising.
II.

WHO

IS SPEAKING,

PLEASE?

The reification of Congress as an interpretive entity masks important distinctions among various contributors to the constitutional dialogue. Fisher's examples of coordinate construction usually concern
statutes enacted through bicameralism and presentment to the President, but also involve resolutions of a single House and unenacted
bills.4" The statutes include the special category of legislation enacted
by the First Congress, and the series of later statutes that can amount
to longstanding interpretations. 4 1 Fisher does not discuss a different
form of coordinate construction, the interpretations expressed by the
Senate in its advice and consent role.4 2 These various "congressional"
voices speak differently, and sometimes inconsistently. Attributing interpretive authority to all of them could tend toward "protestantism"
rather than special powers of coordinate construction.
The interpretations of the First Congress remain in a category by
themselves. Much of their persuasive authority depends on "original
intent" strands of the interpretive practice of the courts (though this did
not stop Chief Justice Marshall from invalidating a provision of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 in Marbury v. Madison). Moreover, they hardly
provide an example of ongoing dialogue with the courts: we know of no
constitutional issues that were raised in the Supreme Court while the
First Congress was sitting,4 3 and the dialogue since it disbanded has
been profoundly one-sided.
Longstanding congressional interpretations play a particularly significant role in the separation of powers, where their implications for
the power of Congress have usually been melancholy. The very existence of the bill of attainder clause in Article I, section 9 calls attention
to the absence of a more general conceptual norm of separated powers;
if the branches were already limited to their paradigmatic functions, the

40

L. Fisher, supra note 2, at 256.
See id. at 252, 254.

4' See id. at 235-37, 243-44.
42 See Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1351-1558

(1989); cf. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Representative challenges authority of President and Senate to dispose of Panama Canal by treaty rather
than statute), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
"I See 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 662-721 (Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise, P. Freund ed. 1971).
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ban on bills of attainder would be redundant. The respective domains
of the Executive and the Legislature have especially drawn content
from historical usage. This process certainly illustrates the negative
power of Congress to legitimate encroachments by another branch
through acquiescence over time. The constitutional effect of "persistent
legislative practice""' has most often been to give away power to the
President. Surprisingly, Fisher lists United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Co. 45 as an example of Congress's successes in coordinate construction."6 The withering of the domestic nondelegation doctrine comes
equally to mind.
Coordinate construction would be exhibited as a more powerful
doctrine if it enabled the contemporary Congress to wrest back the
powers that earlier Congresses have yielded through acquiescence over
time. But often enough the living voice of Congress is drowned out by
ancestral echoes.
A. Just Say No
Persistent legislative practice was not enough to prevent the Supreme Court, in INS v. Chadha,47 from invalidating the legislative veto
device that Congress had evolved for controlling delegated authority.
Chadha and its corollaries48 involve a double defeat for congressional
coordinate construction: the Court rejected the constitutional interpretation expressed in copious instances of veto-bearing legislation, and held
instead that concurrent majorities in Congress cannot speak in binding
fashion. The Court let presidential verbal statements impugning legislative vetoes undermine the dialectical action of signing them into law,
and it felt free to rely on its own interpretation of Article I. The
Court's opinion gave more notice to a single presidential soliloquy49
44 L. FISHER, supra note 2, at 235-37.
45 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (recognizing broad inherent presidential authority in foreign affairs in the course of upholding delegation, giving prominent attention to a
speech by Representative John Marshall).
48 But see L. FISHER, supra note 23, at 108-10, 127 (criticizing Curtiss-Wright
and its application).
47 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
41 The Court invalidated a one-house legislative veto of an adjudicatory decision
in Chadha itself, and two weeks later, by summary affirmance, invalidated one-house
and two-house vetoes of regulations. See Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer
Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
41 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942 n.13 (citing Jackson, A PresidentialLegal Opinion, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1353 (1953)). Justice Jackson's (extrajudicial) view of this
secret "opinion" was somewhat different: "Despite the high official position of its author, it was not an official act but a personal explanation and opinion of Franklin D.
Roosevelt on a smoldering issue between the Executive and Congress." Jackson, supra,
at 1360.

1864

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 137:1851

than to the accumulated evidence of executive compliance with past vetoes.50 Congress was mocked with its own past successes in the course
of a lengthy footnote asserting the greater legitimacy of delegated
lawmaking. 5
Admittedly, my slippage from "presidential" to "executive" illustrates the parallel difficulties in working out the coordinate construction
thesis on the Executive Branch side. When the President decides, on
balance, to sign into law a bill containing a legislative veto provision, he
waives a "constitutional and effective power of self-defence"; 52 when he
directs compliance with a legislative veto, his action further legitimates
its actual exercise. When subordinate officials comply with a legislative
veto, however, locating the speaker becomes more complex. Fisher's
discussion does not make clear to what degree the special authority of
coordinate construction should be viewed as delegated and subdelegated
within the Executive Branch. That question is complicated by the
Court's continued rejection of the unitary executive theory and its implications. 5" Advice from high-level Justice Department circles is likely
to inform compliance or noncompliance policy, but not necessarily to
control it.54 Subdelegation would push us once more to the Article VI
oath, decentralization, and "protestantism."
If we limit special interpretive authority to the President himself
as the canonical personification of his branch, then his powers of coor50 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 960-61, 964 n.7; Brief of United States Senate at 4950, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (tabulating 229 vetoes of suspensions of deportation); Brief of Senate on Reargument at 41-43, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (listing 23 disapprovals of executive reorganizations); id. at 45-49 (listing 65
disapprovals of presidential budget deferrals). A stronger argument in the Court's favor
could be built on the instances of presidential veto of statutes because of their legislative
veto provisions, and of executive noncompliance with exercised vetoes. But the Court
saw no need for such care.
See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
5 THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
5 See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)
(noting "duties . . . the discharge of which the President can not in a particular case
properly influence or control").
" Compare, for example, Secretary of Education Hufstedler's refusal, pursuant to
an Opinion of the Attorney General, to obey a legislative veto, with the insistence of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, an independent agency, on compliance. See
Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 438, 454 n.121 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), affd mem. 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); B. CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO:
CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF REGULATION 107-14, 137-38 (1983).
The similarity between this difficulty and the contours of the presentment clause
problem in Chadha is not coincidental. See e.g., Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look
at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 1071-87 (1975)
(differentiating among legislative veto schemes based on President's control of executive
source of proposal); Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the
Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 812-17 (same).
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dinate construction are amplified by the usual advantages of his unity.5"
Moreover, as a result of the presentment clause, Congress can speak
through legislation only by securing the President's agreement or by
harmonizing disparate personalities into concurrent supermajorities.
The President faces no such obstacle; indeed he benefits from a form of
double-counting.
Fisher argues that legislative vetoes are an indispensable method
of legislation, and describes approvingly congressional "noncompliance"
with the Chadha decision by means of continued enactment of legislative vetoes for appropriations, as well as the use of informal equivalents
such as agency undertakings to be guided by consultation with a congressional committee.56 I think the story he tells illustrates other interesting aspects of constitutional dialogue. First, one might note that
Congress has not directly assaulted Chadha in the ruthless manner that
a coordinate construction doctrine might justify. The statute invalidated
in Chadha authorized either House of Congress by simple majority
vote to override executive decisions to "suspend deportation" of particular named aliens. But Congress has not responded by pressuring the
executive to deport individual aliens in spite of suspension decisions,
and forcing the individuals to shoulder the costs of relitigating Chadha
at the risk of physical expulsion.57 That kind of vigorous nonacquiescence, like the nonacquiescence in statutory interpretation that the Reagan administration pursued against disability benefit claimants, would
achieve dialogue at the cost of the immediate suffering of the powerless.
Testing the limits of Chadha as applied to appropriations statutes
can represent skepticism about judicial dicta rather than noncompliance
with the decision.58 This oblique method of reopening the dialogue by
shifting its ground avoids direct confrontation. The Court's opinion in
Chadha has been widely criticized because of Chief Justice Burger's
blindly formalistic approach to separation of powers. The opinion declares the invalidity of any legislative veto, by one or both Houses, that
has the effect of changing the legal responsibilities of any private individual or public official outside the Legislative Branch. This broad
16 See THE
56

See L.

supra note 52, at No. 70 (A. Hamilton).
supra note 2, at 225; see also Pear, Pact Challenged by Bush

FEDERALIST,

FISHER,

Counsel, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1989, at Al, col. 5 (second thoughts on agreement

conditioning continued Contra aid on agreement of four committees).
57To the contrary, Congress recently repealed even the vestigial requirement that
suspensions be reported to it. See Immigration Technical Corrections Act of 1988, Pub.

L. No. 100-525, § 2(q)(1)(B), 102 Stat. 2614.
11 Fisher openly recognized this in the article from which this passage of the book
derives. See Fisher, JudicialMisjudgments About the Lawmaking Process: The Legislative Veto Case, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 705 (1985).
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scope extends far beyond the categories of cases the Supreme Court has
actually decided.59 Even if Chief Justice Burger sought to resolve the
case on the basis of a formalistic definition of "legislative" action, the
constitutional implications of legislative vetoes that directly affect individual rights arguably differ from those of legislative vetoes that affect
only housekeeping aspects of government. Indeed, despite widespread
agreement that Chief Justice Burger's opinion was defective, there is
considerable scholarly support for the result in Chadha.0
If Fisher is correct about the necessity, then Congress may yet persuade the Court to preserve a more limited role for the legislative veto.
Congress can evidence its need for the device by continuing to enact
them over time and cajoling the executive into compliance. Restricting
legislative vetoes to intragovernmental measures may postpone a reflexive, premature invalidation, because such measures less frequently incite litigable controversies."' Eventually, the Court might distinguish
Chadha and uphold some of them - Chief Justice Rehnquist has recently exhibited a more sophisticated approach to separation of powers
than his predecessor's.
Moreover, the informal substitutes that Fisher describes include
processes substantially similar to those that operated before Chadha.
Studies of rulemaking in the heyday of the legislative veto suggested a
trend toward bargaining in the shadow of the veto.6 2 The continuation
of this trend could cut either way. On the one hand, a Court willing to
" Lower courts, however, have extended Chadha to legislative vetoes of executive
reorganizations and impoundment of appropriated funds. See, e.g., City of New Haven
v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987); EEOC v. CBS, 743 F.2d 969 (2d Cir.
1984); EEOC v. Hernando Bank, 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1984); see also AFGE v.
Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (pre-Chadha).
"0See e.g., Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 125 (1984); Strauss, supra note
54, at 817-19; Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1691-92, 1732 n.197 (1984); Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by
Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1984).
6" But see supra note 59. One of the tools that a legislature can employ to enhance its voice in the constitutional dialogue is agenda control. The direction of doctrinal development in a system that includes a norm of precedent is substantially pathdependent. Lawyers attempt to exploit this characteristic in their strategic choice of
plaintiffs and defendants, and Fisher illustrates the Justices' strategic exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. See L. FISHER, supra note 2, at 169-70. Legislatures sometimes
manipulate jurisdiction; this phenomenon includes not only the disputed power to withhold jurisdiction but also the undoubted power to create categories of mandatory appeals. Congress can also frame cases strategically by shaping its legislation.
62 See B. CRAIG, supra note 54, at 74-78; Bruff & Gellhorn, CongressionalControl of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1369, 1409-23 (1977); see also Frickey, The Constitutionalityof Legislative Committee
Suspension of Administrative Rules: The Case of Minnesota, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1237,
1242-46 (1986) (similar findings under state suspension procedure).
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let empirical evidence of the actual workings of government inform its
separation of powers decisions might eventually be forced to conclude
that silencing the legislative veto has driven policymaking further into
off-stage whispers, rather than improved its deliberative character. On
the other hand, the traditional presumption of administrative regularity
has proven to be a potent source of judicial blindness to the actualities
of administrative decisionmaking. Fictionalized rulemaking procedure
has come strongly into vogue since the issuance of Executive Order 12,291. A Court primarily concerned with the symbolic, facial legitimacy of Congress's oversight methods might let de facto intervention
by committees flourish, but deny them the option of de jure action.
It must also be remembered that legitimating one-House, and especially committee, vetoes would add new independent voices to the
constitutional dialogue. Legislative vetoes, if permissible, are official
acts with force of law; they would enable Congress to "speak" more
frequently, though more variously.
B.

Speak Softly, But Speak For Yourself

Congress and its members have also sought the assistance of the
courts in recovering power from the Executive. Participation as amicus
in defense of its constitutional authority 63 returns Congress to purely
communicative constitutional dialogue. Initiating litigation 4 involves
the additional power of opening or reopening the conversation at times
of its (or their) own choosing. 5
The courts have not always been receptive to such efforts by Congress or its members to draw them into conversation. Ever since its
1974 decision giving Senator Kennedy victory over an intrasession
pocket veto by President Nixon, 6 the D.C. Circuit has struggled to
identify when legislators should be heard to complain of injury to legislative prerogatives. Although analogies to voting rights and other individual rights contexts appear to support congressional standing, the
judges have been reluctant to intervene prematurely in intragovernmental disputes. Then-Circuit Judges Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia condemned the entire notion of congressional standing as violating the separation of powers. Scalia insisted that the role of the courts was
6 See L. FISHER, supra note 2, at 30-31.
See id. at 31-33.
15 See Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881, 893 (1983) ("It is of no use to draw the
courts into a public policy dispute after the battle is over, or after the enthusiasm that
produced it has waned.").
66 See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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"neither to supervise the internal workings of the executive and legislative branches nor to umpire disputes between those branches regarding
their respective powers." 6 Bork similarly maintained that it was better
for courts to stand aside, letting the "power of the branches with respect to one another . . . ebb and flow as the exigencies of changing

circumstances suggest."6 8
Current D.C. Circuit practice, in contrast, admits congressional
standing, but relies on a power of "equitable discretion" to dismiss suits
brought by individual members of Congress seeking relief that Congress itself could have given them but did not.69 This practice privileges
the voices of blocking coalitions over the voices of dissident members. It
amounts to a constitutional common law rule implementing perceived
separation of powers concerns, made possible by Congress's general
failure to legislate court access for congressional plaintiffs.7 0 The Supreme Court has thus far passed up opportunities to clarify these
1
7

issues.

Faced with judicial hesitancy to accept the invitation to converse,
Congress may attempt the additional step of rewriting the rules governing the opportunity to litigate. One of Congress's greatest successes
in coordinate construction was such an instance of metaspeech, the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934. With Justice Stone's encouragement,
Congress converted a perceived Article III rule, equating noncoercive
relief with forbidden advisory opinions, into a purely historical feature
of the federal common law of remedies. Congress thereby empowered
the federal courts merely to speak, and it has turned out that the lesser
power exceeds the greater. The consequences for administrative law
and constitutional litigation have been profound. Could Congress repeat
this feat by augmenting its own power to converse with the courts?
One of Fisher's stories calls into question the power of coordinate
construction to resolve this debate. Like any good saga, it begins with
an earlier generation:"' in Ex parte Lbvitt," the Supreme Court had
6 Moore v. United States House of Reps., 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
68 Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
69 See Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Riegle v. Federal
Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
See generally McGowan, Congressmen In Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV.
241 (1981).
1o But see 2 U.S.C. § 2881(a) (1982) (granting Senate Counsel standing to intervene in existing litigation to the limits of Article III).
7" See, e.g., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.

714, 721 (1986); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
11 See C. CLOVER, THE MEDIEVAL SAGA 37-39 (1982).
73 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
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tersely rejected on standing grounds a lawyer's challenge to Justice
Black's appointment from the Senate, after Justice Van Devanter had
been lured off the bench by a generous retirement statute. 4 Lvitt
claimed that the appointment violated the ineligibility clause of Article I, section 6," which was designed to restrict the Executive from
76
influencing legislators with the prospect of lucrative appointments.
The Court found, however, that Lvitt shared only "a general interest
common to all members of the public."7 7 In modern terms, the requirement of injury for standing is regarded as constitutionally based, but
the requirement that the injury not be generally shared is usually regarded as prudential, i.e., a rule of constitutional common law adopted
by the Court to govern the federal courts.
When a different issue arose under this clause concerning Circuit
Judge Abner J. Mikva,7 8 Congress sought to circumvent Levitt through
an express statutory grant of authority permitting dissenting members
of Congress to bring suit. The attempt failed in the little-noticed case of
McClure v. Reagan, 9 which is, to the best of my knowledge, the only
instance in which the modern Supreme Court has 'invalidated a statutory grant of standing. That it did so by summary affirmance is all the
more remarkable.
A prospective statute permitting dissident members of Congress to
speak as plaintiffs seems an appropriate means of protecting against
executive cooptation of future Congresses."0 The statute actually enSee L. FISHER, supra note 2, at 146, 151.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6 reads: "No Senator or Representative shall, during the
Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of
the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall
have been increased during such time."
74
7'

78

See

THE FEDERALIST,

supra note 52, at No. 76 (A. Hamilton). History in-

forms that this corruption of the Legislature by executive patronage was a central con-

cern of the Whig tradition. See G.

WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUB-

LIC, 1776-1787, at 32-34, 551-52 (1969).
7 Lkvitt, 302 U.S. at 634.
78 Judge Mikva was appointed before it became clear whether a pending salary
increase for the Judiciary would become law. The Attorney General has traditionally
interpreted the ineligibility clause, on both grammatical and practical grounds, as limited to increases in emoluments that precede the appointment. See 125 CONG. REC.
26046-48 (1979) (memoranda from Office of Legal Counsel).
79 454 U.S. 1054 (1982), affg mem. McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265
(D.
Idaho 1981) (three-judge court). The best discussion of the case I have found in the
literature is a single textual footnote in Spann, ExpositoryJustice, 131 U. PA. L. REv.
585, 655 n.297 (1983). Fisher mentions the case, but not the statute. See L. FISHER,
supra note 2, at 146.
11 Against its historical background, see supra note 76, it would appear that the
injury contemplated by the ineligibility clause was increased executive influence on the
legislative process. Though the resulting injury may be so widespread as to justify a
prudential standing rule against citizen suits, that does not mean that Congress should
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acted in 1979, which authorized suit only by members of the Congress
then sitting to challenge appointments from that Congress to the D.C.
Circuit, had a rather different flavor, but for Article III purposes the
principle should be the same. Moreover, since the Senate, rather than
Congress as a whole, gives advice and consent to appointments, the "initial interpretation" expressed through confirmation may exclude the
views of the House of Representatives; once more it is not easy to identify the voice of "Congress" on a constitutional issue. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision of the three-judge
court dismissing the case for lack of standing.
If McClure is a sport, or was just badly litigated, then it may tell
us little about congressional standing or Congress's power to confer
standing on itself and its members. It suggests, however, that the Court
may insist upon asserting the paradoxical Marburian power of refusing
gifts of jurisdiction. Justice Scalia has already expressed the view that
broad grants of standing in environmental statutes violate Article III."1
There is, however, nothing inherently nonjusticiable about a "'genera8 2 against unlawful conduct - most
lized grievance' pervasively shared"1
criminal prosecution is based on little else. The real question in determining the constitutionality of a statutory grant of standing is the scope
of the Executive Branch's monopoly on litigative speech. Standing provisions specifically designed to enforce limits on the Executive constitute
a candid "attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch," although not necessarily a "'congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions.' "83 Special Article III rules rejecting congressional standing, though phrased as limits
on the power of the courts, would really amount to limits on the powers of Congress vis-A-vis the Executive. They may prove to illustrate
yet another failure of coordinate construction.
lack the power to authorize litigation to vindicate legislative independence. Proving actual corruption of the legislative process should not be necessary when a member of
Congress complains that he has been outvoted in a body that has been exposed to unlawful temptations. Litigants improperly subjected to decisions by judges without Article III tenure and salary protections are not required to prove that the judges are actually subservient, or that Article III judges would have decided their cases differently.
Nor can it be said that suits to unseat wrongfully appointed officials are traditionally
nonjusticiable, given the history of actions in the nature of quo warranto. See 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *262-64.
81 See Scalia, supra note 65, at 895-96; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982) (citizen suit
provisions of Clean Air Act granting standing to "any person").
82 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
88 Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2620 (1988) (quoting Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986)).
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Despite its other strengths, ConstitutionalDialogues does not succeed in building a secure middle way between the rocky road of "protestantism" and the primrose path to judicial supremacy. Congress as a
political institution exerts influence on constitutional development. But
so do subgroups within Congress, and groups partly or wholly outside
the federal government, like political parties, state legislatures,
churches, television networks, and law schools.84 Even within the narrower vision of the legal culture, "Congress" has too many competitors
and too many limitations to serve as the triumvir Fisher envisions.
Thus Fisher's lessons turn us back to ourselves. If the Court, however Supreme, is neither final nor infallible, we should not look within
the national government for a second-best. The solution is not to relax
the inhibitions on more powerful, self-interested actors, for whom dialogue is mainly a metaphor. The remedy to be applied is more speech.
If the Court cannot lead with a solo voice then it, and we, must listen
with care to millions.

84

(1988).
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